Secure Implementation

Tatsuyoshi Saijo (), Tomas Sjostrom () and Takehiko Yamato ()
Additional contact information
Tatsuyoshi Saijo: Osaka University
Tomas Sjostrom: Department of Economics, Rutgers University
Takehiko Yamato: Department of Values and Decision Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology

No 56, Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science

Abstract: Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible solution to this problem is to require double implementation in Nash equilibrium and in dominant strategies, i.e., secure implementation. We characterize securely implementable social choice functions, and compare our results with dominant strategy implementation. In standard quasi-linear environments with divisible private or public goods, there exist Pareto efficient (non-dictatorial) social choice functions that can be securely implemented. But in the absence of side-payments, secure implementation is incompatible with Pareto efficiency.

JEL-codes: C92 D71 D78 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pbe
Date: Written 2005-07
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