Incentives and Regional Coordination in Employment Services

Arjen de Vetten

CPB Memoranda from CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis

Abstract: This paper presents a game theoretical model that addresses the trade off between regional coordination and incentives in the mediation of unemployed in the Netherlands. Due to yardstick competition, municipalities have financial incentives to reduce unemployment, but are not likely to cooperate with each other to have the scale advantages of a regional labour market. On the other hand, a regional public employment service, like the CWI in the Netherlands, has a higher probability and value of matching, but it lacks the incentives to exert the optimal mediation effort. The model is calibrated with information on vacancies and CWI clients for the Netherlands, in order to get an impression whether it is optimal to have a public employment service in the context of this model. Finally, various institutional settings, like a privatised employment service and a performance contract for the employment office, are considered.

Keywords: public employment service; unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H11 H72 J6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-lab
Date: Written 2007-10
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cpb.nl/eng/pub/cpbreeksen/memorandum/190/memo190.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CPB Memoranda from CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by ().