Competition, Takeovers and Gender Discrimination

Fredrik Heyman (), Helena Svaleryd () and Jonas Vlachos ()

No 6879, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Theories of taste-based discrimination predict that competitive pressures will drive discriminatory behaviour out of the market. Using detailed matched employer-employee data, we analyze how firm takeovers and product market competition are related to the gender composition of the firm’s workforce and the gender wage gap. Using a difference-in-difference framework and dealing with several endogeneity concerns, we find that the share of female employees increases as a result of an ownership change, in particular when product market competition is weak. Further, increased competition reduces the gender wage gap, especially among highly educated employees. While the estimated wage effect is quite small, the results support the main theoretical predictions.

Keywords: Competition; Discrimination; Takeovers; Wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J2 J31 J7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-lab and nep-mic
Date: Written 2008-06

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