Testing the strong-form of market discipline: the effects of public market signals on bank risk

No 2004-19, Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory from Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Abstract: Under the strong-form of market discipline, publicly traded banks that have constantly available public market signals from their stock (and bond) prices would take less risk than non-publicly traded banks because counterparties, borrowers, and regulators could react to adverse public market signals against publicly traded banks. In comparing the credit risk, earnings risk, capitalization, and failure risk between publicly traded and non-publicly traded banks, the evidence in this paper rejects the strong-form of market discipline. In fact, the findings indicate that banking organizations tend to take more risk when they were publicly traded than when they were privately owned.

Keywords: Stock market; Risk; Banks and banking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-rmg
Date: Written 2004
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