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Details about Thomas Troger

E-mail:
Homepage:http://www.econ3.uni-bonn.de/troeger/
Phone:++49 +228 737995
Postal address:Institute for Economic Theory III Universitaet Bonn Adenauerallee 24-26 53113 Bonn GERMANY
Workplace:Wirtschaftstheoretische Abteilung III (Department of Economic Theory III), Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Fachbereich (Economics Department), Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Thomas Troger.

Last updated 2009-03-31. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: ptr15


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Working Papers

2009

  1. Matching Heterogeneous Agents with a Linear Search Technology
    Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany Downloads

2008

  1. Collusion via Resale
    Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany Downloads
    Also in Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics (2007) Downloads View citations
  2. Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information
    Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany Downloads

2006

  1. A Characterization of the Conditions for Optimal Auction with Resale
    Discussion Papers, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich Downloads View citations
  2. Garbled Elections
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Downloads
    Also in Discussion Papers, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich (2006) Downloads

2005

  1. A Characterization of the Distributions That Imply Existence of Linear Equilbria in the Kyle-Model
    Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany Downloads
    Also in Discussion Papers, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich (2005) Downloads

    See also Journal Article in Annals of Finance (2006)
  2. A note on Zheng’s conditions for implementing an optimal auction with resale
    Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany Downloads View citations
  3. Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
    Discussion Papers, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich Downloads View citations
    Also in Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany (2005) Downloads View citations
    Microeconomics, EconWPA (2004) Downloads View citations

    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2006)

2004

  1. On the Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Rochet-Vila Model of Market Making
    Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany Downloads View citations
  2. The Impact of Resale on 2-Bidder First-Price Auctions where One Bidder's Value is Commonly Known
    Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany Downloads

2003

  1. Speculation in First-Price Auctions with Resale
    Microeconomics, EconWPA Downloads View citations
  2. Speculation in Second-Price Auctions with Resale
    Game Theory and Information, EconWPA Downloads View citations
    Also in University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara (2003) Downloads View citations
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics (2003) Downloads View citations

2002

  1. Double Auctions, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, and the Hold-Up Problem
    University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara Downloads
    Also in University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara (2002) Downloads

2001

  1. Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Kyle Model with Multiple Informed Traders
    Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany Downloads View citations
    See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2001)

1998

  1. An Evolutionary Analysis of Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection
    Working Papers, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy

Journal Articles

2006

  1. A characterization of the distributions that imply existence of linear equilibria in the Kyle-model
    Annals of Finance, 2006, 2, (1), 73-85 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2005)
  2. Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
    Econometrica, 2006, 74, (3), 753-769 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (2005)

2002

  1. An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 40, (2), 153-184 Downloads View citations
  2. Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 102, (2), 375-402 Downloads View citations

2001

  1. Existence of linear equilibria in the Kyle model with multiple informed traders
    Economics Letters, 2001, 72, (2), 159-164 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (2001)
 
 
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