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Designing self-reporting regimes to encourage truth telling: An experimental study

Lana Friesen and Lata Gangadharan ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013, vol. 94, issue C, 90-102

Abstract: We report results from an experiment that investigates truthfulness in self-reporting under different reporting regimes. The experiment involves a production task with self-reporting of accidents, with reporting compulsory for some participants, but only voluntary for others. We find that dishonesty is prevalent, but accident reporting is more frequent with compulsory reporting compared with voluntary. Our results suggest that the lie aversion effect is stronger than any potential crowding out of intrinsic motivation to voluntarily report, and that careful design of self-reporting regimes is necessary by enforcement agencies to achieve satisfactory compliance outcomes. Our results are relevant for areas beyond regulatory compliance, including dishonesty in social security claims, insurance claims, workplace expense claims, income tax returns, and financial reporting.

Keywords: Self-reporting; Enforcement; Dishonesty; Experiment; Individual decision making; Theft; Intrinsic motivation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Working Paper: Designing Self-Reporting Regimes to Encourage Truth Telling: An Experimental Study (2011) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:94:y:2013:i:c:p:90-102

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.007

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