Designing an incentive-compatible safety net in a financial system in transition: the case of Serbia

Srdjan T. Marinkovic

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper looks at banking as a regulated industry. Inequality of information among various participants is assumed as well as the existence of different incentives. The paper argues that regulation in general and a safety net in particular are necessary to make the financial service industry operate in a safe and appropriate way. From this vantage point, transition banking and, more closely, peculiarities of the Serbian system are analysed. Some guidelines for redesigning the existing safety net in Serbian banking are proposed.

JEL-codes: F3 G3 N0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2005-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:23375

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