Leniency program and cartel deterrence in Russia: effects assessment

Guzel Yusupova ()

HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract: The empirical assessment of leniency program (LP) in Russia shows the effects of changes in the rules on the behavior of market participants. In this paper we test hypotheses about LP enforcement against the characteristics of cartels: their subject, duration and the number of participants. We show that LP in Russia makes enforcement of the behavior of market participants less effective and accordingly reduces cartel discoveries. However the reforms of Program in 2009 give some positive results

Keywords: Leniency Program; Collusion; Antitrust legislation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K2 K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-com, nep-law and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in WP BRP Series: Public Administration / PA, November 2013, pages 1-22

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:06/pa/2013

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