Entry Mistakes with strategic Pricing

Bernardino Adao ()

Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2003, issue 70, pages 181-197

Abstract: This paper concerns entry mistakes when the incumbent practices strategic pricing. Due to an agency problem between the owner and the manager of the entrant firm there may be equilibria with too much entry that are preferred by both the entrant and the incumbent. This result is surprising because it would be expected that the entrant would prefer to know the type of incumbent in the industry before he takes his decision.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076379 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Entry Mistakes with Strategic Pricing (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2003:i:70:p:08

Access Statistics for this article

Annales d'Economie et de Statistique is edited by Robert Gary-Bobo

More articles in Annales d'Economie et de Statistique from ENSAE
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Robert Gary-Bobo ().