Generalized Binary Constitutions and the Whole Set of Arrovian Social Welfare Functions

Nicolas Gabriel ANDJIGA, Issofa MOUYOUWOU and Joël MOULEN

Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2011, issue 101-102, pages 187-202

Abstract: Arrow’s theorem [1963] states that a social welfare function (SWF) that simultaneously satis.es completeness, transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and Pareto principle is necessarily dictatorial in the sense that the social decision on any pair of candidates coincides with the strict preference of a fixed individual, the Arrow’s dictator. When individual preferences are weak orders, no further description is provided on the social outcome as soon as the Arrow’s dictator is indifferent on a pair of candidates. We provide in the present paper another proof of the Arrow’s theorem using generalized binary constitutions. Moreover we completely characterize the set of Arrovian SWFs, those are complete and transitive SWFs that satisfy IIA and the Pareto principle.

Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=annaeconstat (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2011:i:101-102:p:09

Access Statistics for this article

Annales d'Economie et de Statistique is edited by Robert Gary-Bobo

More articles in Annales d'Economie et de Statistique from ENSAE
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Robert Gary-Bobo ().