Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment

Emel Filiz-Ozbay and Erkut Y. Ozbay ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Emel Filiz Ozbay

American Economic Review, 2007, vol. 97, issue 4, pages 1407-1418

Abstract: This paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first-price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret (felt when bidders lose at an affordable price). Different information structures are created to elicit regret: bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose (loser regret condition); or the second-highest bid if they win (winner regret condition); or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids. Bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid. However, bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret. (JEL D44)

Date: 2007
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