Private Information and the Allocation of Land Use Subsidies in Malawi
B. Kelsey Jack
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2013, vol. 5, issue 3, pages 113-35
Efficient targeting of public programs is difficult when the cost or benefit to potential recipients is private information. This study illustrates the potential of self-selection to improve allocational outcomes in the context of a program that subsidizes tree planting in Malawi. Landholders who received a tree planting contract as a result of bidding in an auction kept significantly more trees alive over a three year period than did landholders who received the contract through a lottery. The gains from targeting on private information through the auction represent a 30 percent cost savings per surviving tree for the implementing organization.
JEL-codes: D04 D44 D82 O13 Q24 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.5.3.113
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:5:y:2013:i:3:p:113-35
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics from American Economic Association
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Jane Voros ().