An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats

Christoph Brunner, Jacob K Goeree (), Charles A. Holt () and John O. Ledyard

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2010, vol. 2, issue 1, pages 39-57

Abstract: This paper reports laboratory experiments that evaluate the performance of a flexible package bidding format developed by the FCC, in comparison with other combinatorial formats. In general, the interest of policy makers in combinatorial auctions is justified by the laboratory data. When value complementarities are present, package bidding yields improved performance. We find clear differences among the combinatorial auction formats both in terms of efficiency and seller revenue, however. Notably, the combinatorial clock provides the highest revenue. The FCC's flexible package bidding format performed worse than the alternatives, which is one of the main reasons why it was not implemented. (JEL D44, H82)

JEL-codes: D44 H82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.1.39
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