Details Matter: The Impact of Presentation and Information on the Take-Up of Financial Incentives for Retirement Saving

Emmanuel Saez

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2009, vol. 1, issue 1, pages 204-28

Abstract: We examine the effects of presentation and information on the take-up of financial subsidies for retirement saving in a large randomized experiment carried out with H&R Block. The subsidies raise take-up and contributions with larger effects when the subsidy is characterized as a matching contribution rather than an equivalent-value tax credit (or cash back), and when filers are informed before the tax season about the subsidy. The results imply that both pure incentives and the presentation of those incentives affect consumer choices. (JEL D14, H24, H31, J26)

Date: 2009
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