Evolution and Game Theory

Larry Samuelson

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2002, vol. 16, issue 2, pages 47-66

Abstract: Research in noncooperative game theory has focused attention on two questions: Should we expect equilibrium play? If so, which of the multiple equilibria that arise in many games should we expect? This paper summarizes recent approaches to these questions that have been based on evolutionary models.

Date: 2002
Note: DOI: 10.1257/0895330027256
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