Fiscal FederalismTatiana Mosteanu and Mihaela Iacob () Theoretical and Applied Economics, 2007, vol. 6(511), issue 6(511), pages 21-26 Abstract: The central budget of a country collects only a fraction of the total fiscal revenues and executes only o fraction of the national public expenditures, the rest of the revenues and expenditures becoming the responsability of subnational governments. The economist Charles Tiebout developed a theoretical model which although makes an imperfect description of the reality, shows that people’s mobility is being influenced by tax rates and the amount of state/local expenditures. Thus, he suggests that the degree of responsibility that can be appointed to the local budgets should subscribe to the tax – benefits ratio, the extend of the positive externalities and the scale economies of public goods. Also, the issue of revenues distribution among communities is being raised, being identified three kinds of grants used by the public authorities: matching grants, block grants and conditional block grants. In the concept of fiscal federalism there can be found a limited analogy between national public finance theory and international public finance theory, with the international taxation as the pivotal element. Keywords: optimal fiscal federalism; the Tiebout Model; intergovernmental grants; international taxation. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:agr:journl:v:6(511):y:2007:i:6(511):p:21-26 Access Statistics for this article Theoretical and Applied Economics is edited by Marin Dinu More articles in Theoretical and Applied Economics from Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER |
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