Testing Whether Field Auction Experiments Are Demand Revealing in Practice

Jay R. Corrigan () and Matthew C Rousu ()

Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 2008, vol. 33, issue 2

Abstract: Recent evidence suggests that participants' misunderstanding of experimental auction mechanism can systematically bias auction results. We present a simple technique for testing whether field auction mechanism and, by extension, whether auction bids provide an unbiased estimate of participants' willingness to pay.

Keywords: Demand revealing; Experimental auctions; Field experiments; Demand and Price Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Testing Whether Field Auction Experiments are Demand Revealing in Practice (2008)
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