Strategic Interaction in United States Fishery Management Councils

Joseph E. Powers

Marine Resource Economics, 2004, vol. 19, issue 4

Abstract: A two-stage model of interactions within Regional Fishery Management Councils was developed in which management targets were set which may deviate from levels needed to achieve management policy. The first stage modeled bargaining solutions between Council members (harvesters, conservationists, and government) for management targets, and the second stage addressed litigation of those solutions. Results indicate that bargaining power favoring one constituent group could lead to Council outcomes that deviate from management policy. This, in turn, creates incentives for the aggrieved constituent group to litigate. Tradeoffs between benefits and costs of litigation and governmental strategies to address these issues are explored.

Keywords: fishery management; cooperative and non-cooperative games; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D73; D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://purl.umn.edu/28159 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:mareec:28159

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Marine Resource Economics from Marine Resources Foundation
Series data maintained by AgEcon Search ().