Modelling Government Processes and Policies in Agriculture: A Review
Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, 1995, vol. 63, issue 03
In this paper, political preference functions and bargaining models based on game theory are examined for their relevance to government processes and policies in agriculture. While bargaining models show some refinements over preference models in explaining how interest group demands are met in a modern society, the results appear to still fall short of a well-documented understanding of the political economy and institutions involved in policy decisions. In practical terms, economic modelling is too time-consuming and elaborate to inform everyday decisions of government but an understanding of the principles involved and previous results of this kind of analysis can inform the work of both policy advisors and decision makers.
Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:remaae:12380
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