Why do banks securitize? Evidence from Italy

Mariarosaria Agostino and Maria Mazzuca
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Mariarosaria Agostino: Università della Calabria
Maria Mazzuca: Università della Calabria

BANCARIA, 2009, vol. 9, pages 18-38

Abstract: The paper explores the motivations underlying the securitization activity of Italian banks from 1999 to 2006. By estimating probit and proportional hazard duration models, in which the probability of placing securitizations is linked to a set of balance sheet indicators and a vector of further control variables, it tests the hypotheses of funding, specialization and regulatory capital arbitrage. Consistently with the funding hypothesis, the main conclusion is that Italian banks seem to securitize to diversify the available funding channels. Besides, the status of the bank on the Stock exchange and also its dimension positively affect the decision of securitizing.

Keywords: cartolarizzazione; raccolta bancaria; regulatory capital arbitrage; specializzazione bancaria; probit model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G20 G21 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ban:bancar:v:9:y:2009:m:september:p:18-38

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