Railcar Auctions for Grain Shipments: A Strategic Analysis
William Wilson and
Bruce Dahl Additional contact information William Wilson: North Dakota State University, Fargo, North Dakota, USA
Bruce Dahl: North Dakota State University, Fargo, North Dakota, USA
Abstract:
Many of the North American railroads have introduced differentiated services for grain shipments in the past decade. Most interesting have been innovations in guaranteed railcar service which have evolved since their inception. In most cases, pricing and allocation of these services have used some type of bidding mechanism. This paper explores the strategic implications of these mechanisms for the grain shipping industry. A model was developed to analyze the effects of critical variables on equilibrium bids. The paper extends the literature on pricing and car allocation mechanisms whereby auctions are used as an alternative to negotiations and posted-prices in the rail transport sector.
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