Imperfect Competition and Strategic Trade Theory: Evidence for International Food and Agricultural Markets

Jeffrey J. Reimer () and Kyle Stiegert
Additional contact information
Kyle Stiegert: University of Wisconsin-Madison

Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, 2006, vol. 4, issue 1, pages 1134-1134

Abstract: Strategic trade theory offers a way of conceptualizing and testing for strategic government interventions in imperfectly competitive international markets. This survey critically assesses recent empirical evidence, with a focus on food and agricultural markets. One finding is that while many international markets are characterized by oligopoly, price-cost markups tend to be small, and the potential gains from intervention are modest at best. In turn, empirical work has turned up few examples in which government intervention has been optimal in a strategic trade sense. Nonetheless, governments are found to frequently intervene on behalf of domestic firms and play a major role in shaping the nature of international competition. Suggestions for future research are made.

Keywords: imperfect competition; oligopoly; protectionism; strategic trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: oai:bepress:jafio-1134
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1134&context=jafio (application/pdf)
Subscription to the journal may be required to access full texts.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.bepress.com/subscriptions.html

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization from Berkeley Electronic Press
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().