Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game

Advances in Theoretical Economics, 2002, vol. 1, issue 1, pages 1027-1027

Abstract: The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication can make coordinated action impossible. This paper shows how this conclusion is robust to having a more realistic timing structure of messages, more than two players who meet publicly but not as a plenary group, and may be robust to strategic decisions about whether to communicate.

Keywords: common knowledge; communication; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: oai:bepress:bejte-1027
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