Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility

Sujoy Mukerji () and Hyun Song Shin
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Hyun Song Shin: London School of Economics

Advances in Theoretical Economics, 2002, vol. 2, issue 1, pages 1011-1011

Abstract: This paper concerns the interpretation of equilibrium in non-additive beliefs in two-player normal form games. We argue that such equilibria involve beliefs and actions which are consistent with a lack of common knowledge of the game. Our argument rests on representation results which show that different notions of equilibrium in games with non-additive beliefs may be reinterpreted as equilibrium in associated games of incomplete information with additive (Bayesian) beliefs where common knowledge of the (original) game does not apply. The representation results show one way of comparing and understanding the various notions of equilibrium, for games with non-additive beliefs, advanced in the literature.

Keywords: Ambiguity; capacities; Choquet integral; common belief (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: oai:bepress:bejte-1011
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Related works:
Working Paper: Equilibrium Departures From Common Knowledge in Games With Non-Additive Expected Utility (1997)
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