Traceability, Liability, and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality

Sébastien Pouliot and Daniel A. Sumner

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2008, vol. 90, issue 1, pages 15-27

Abstract: Recent food scares such as the discoveries of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and "E. coli"-contaminated spinach have heightened interest in food traceability. Here, we show how exogenous increases in food traceability create incentives for farms and marketing firms to supply safer food by increasing liability costs. We model a stylized marketing chain composed of farms, marketers, and consumers. Unsafe food for consumers can be caused by either marketers or farms. We show that food safety declines with the number of farms and marketers and imperfect traceability from consumers to marketers dampens liability incentives to supply safer food by farms. Copyright ©2008 American Agricultural Economics Association.

Date: 2008
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