Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism

Lars Gårn Hansen (), Frank Jensen (), Urs Steiner Brandt () and Niels Vestergaard ()

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2006, vol. 88, issue 4, pages 974-985

Abstract: To solve the problem of illegal landings this article proposes a new tax mechanism based on the regulator's own aggregate catch estimates and "ex ante" self-reports of planned catch by fishermen. We show that the mechanism avoids illegal landings while ensuring (nearly) optimal exploitation and generating (nearly) correct entry and exit incentives. Finally we simulate the mechanism for the Danish cod fishery in Kattegat to obtain a rough indicator of the size of the tax. It turns out that the average tax payment as a percentage of profit is surprisingly low. Copyright 2006 American Agricultural Economics Association.

Date: 2006
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