The Moral Hazard of Discrimination Reports

Major G. Coleman, William Alexander Darity and Rhonda V. Sharpe

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 2008, vol. 67, issue 2, pages 149-175

Abstract: Antidiscrimination laws are designed to prompt employers to stop excluding black workers from jobs they offer and from treating them unequally with respect to promotion and salaries once on the job. However, a moral hazard effect can arise if the existence of the laws leads black employees to bring unjustified claims of discrimination against employers. It has been argued that employers may become more reluctant to hire black workers for fear of being subjected to frivolous lawsuits. Copyright © 2008 American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc..

Date: 2008

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