Decentralized Policymaking in a Long-Run Growth Model with Seigniorage and Taxes

Sugata Ghosh () and Iannis A Mourmouras

Bulletin of Economic Research, 1999, vol. 51, issue 3, pages 223-35

Abstract: The paper introduces decentralized policymaking into a game-theoretic model with output growth through capital accumulation, and in which the determination of taxes, seigniorage and the long-run growth rate of the economy reflects the strategic interactions between the government, the central bank and the private sector. The paper investigates, among other things, the impact on the long-run growth rate of a higher degree of inflation aversion of the central bank and a higher degree of inefficiency in the tax system. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research

Date: 1999

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