DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC REFORM: THEORY AND SOME EVIDENCE FROM THE RUSSIAN CASE

Serguey Braguinsky ()

Contemporary Economic Policy, 1998, vol. 16, issue 2, pages 227-240

Abstract: The paper examines theoretical issues concerning the relationship between political democracy and economic reform and builds on the empirical material from the recent experience of Russia. The process of transition to democracy is shown to have started spontaneously due to the situation of power stalemate among pressure groups that came to control the communist system in the years preceding its ultimate collapse. The unrestrained control by those groups is shown to be the reason behind the continued economic collapse, while gradual build-up of the democratic system can in the long run act in the direction of improving the chances for a successful economic reform. Copyright 1998 Western Economic Association International.

Date: 1998
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