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CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND INFLATION: A NOTE
Charles T Carlstrom and
Timothy S. Fuerst ()
Economic Inquiry , 2009, vol. 47, issue 1, pages 182-186
Abstract:
"We document increased central bank independence within the set of industrialized nations. This increased independence can account for nearly two-thirds of the improved inflation performance of these nations over the past two decades. "("JEL "E42, E58) Copyright (c) 2008 Western Economic Association International.
Date: 2009
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