Signalling, Inequality and the Social Structure

Ana Ferrer ()

Economica, 2005, vol. 72, issue 3, pages 515-529

Abstract: This paper proposes a theory of endogenous transmission of social status through signalling in the labour market. A signalling game is analysed, in which education, acting as a signalling good, determines one's position in society. The economy's degree of inequality is shown to be a determinant of whether a society is 'aristocratic', where high income is the source of social standing, or 'meritocratic', bestowing status on high ability. Each social structure shows a different balance between production efficiency and social factors such as equality or mobility. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2005.

Date: 2005

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0013-0427.2005.00428.x link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:econom:v:72:y:2005:i:3:p:515-529

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0013-0427

Access Statistics for this article

Economica is edited by Frank Cowell, Tore Ellingsen and Alan Manning

More articles in Economica from London School of Economics and Political Science
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().