Economics and Politics

1997 - 2009

Edited by Peter Rosendorff

from Blackwell Publishing
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND CONFLICTS ON GROWTH IN ASIA pp. 359-383: Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler
DETERRENCE: CREDIBILITY AND PROPORTIONALITY pp. 384-408: Daniel G. Arce and Todd Sandler
TERRORISM AND THE RETURNS TO OIL pp. 409-432: Brock Blomberg, Gregory Hess and J. Hunter Jackson
THE IMPACT OF SOCIETAL RISK ATTITUDES ON TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM pp. 433-451: Paan Jindapon and William Neilson

CORRUPTION AND ELECTIONS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY FOR A CROSS-SECTION OF COUNTRIES pp. 179-200: Stefan Krause and Fabio Méndez
HOW DO POLICY-MAKERS ACTUALLY SOLVE PROBLEMS? EVIDENCE FROM THE FRENCH LOCAL PUBLIC SECTOR pp. 201-231: Benoît Le Maux
COALITION GOVERNMENTS AND SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES pp. 232-254: Sebastian M. Saiegh
POLITICAL PREDATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT pp. 255-277: Jean Paul Azam, Robert H. Bates and Bruno R Biais
A PROTECTIONIST BIAS IN MAJORITARIAN POLITICS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION pp. 278-307: Carolyn L. Evans
WHY DO UNDERGROUND REDUCING POLICIES OFTEN FAIL THEIR SCOPE? SOME ANSWERS FROM THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE pp. 308-318: Bruno Chiarini, Marco Di Domizio and Elisabetta Marzano
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES NOW AND BENEFITS TOMORROW: HOW SOON IS TOMORROW? pp. 319-357: Pierre-Guillaume Méon, Khalid Sekkat and Laurent Weill

LOBBYING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION pp. 1-41: Bilgehan Karabay
INSTABILITY AND THE INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION pp. 42-92: Filipe Campante, Davin Chor and Quoc-Anh Do
THE LOGIC OF AUTHORITARIAN BARGAINS pp. 93-125: Raj M. Desai, Anders Olofsgård and Tarik M. Yousef
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: A LOAN MECHANISM-DESIGN APPROACH pp. 126-158: Alex Mourmouras and Wolfgang Mayer
THE STRATEGIC TIMING OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY pp. 159-177: Marc Meredith

DEMOCRACY AND GLOBALIZATION pp. 289-334: Barry Eichengreen and David Leblang
POLICY COMPROMISES: CORRUPTION AND REGULATION IN A DEMOCRACY pp. 335-360: Toke S Aidt and Jayasri Dutta
THE NON-TRADED SECTOR, LOBBYING, AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE CUSTOMS UNION AND THE COMMON MARKET pp. 361-390: Cyrille Schwellnus
DOES COMPULSORY VOTING HELP EQUALIZE INCOMES? pp. 391-415: Alberto Chong and Mauricio Olivera
VOTING, LOBBYING, AND THE DECENTRALIZATION THEOREM pp. 416-431: Ben Lockwood

IS AN EXPORT SUBSIDY A ROBUST TRADE POLICY RECOMMENDATION TOWARD A UNIONIZED DUOPOLY? pp. 141-155: Jie Ma
CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS: A STRUCTURAL BREAKS APPROACH pp. 156-184: Anders Olofsgård and Zaki Zahran
SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF STRENGTHENING PATENT PROTECTION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY pp. 185-215: Angus C. Chu
THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT PARTISANSHIP: AND THE SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT pp. 216-254: Pablo M. Pinto and Santiago Miguel Pinto
THE WTO AND ANTIDUMPING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES pp. 255-288: Chad P. Bown

PUBLIC PROTECTION OR PRIVATE EXTORTION? pp. 1-32: Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Catherine Hafer
POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL CHECKS ON CORRUPTION: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTS pp. 33-61: James E. Alt and David Dreyer Lassen
A THEORY OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR pp. 62-79: Yoshiaki Azuma and Herschel I. Grossman
WHEN TO RUN AND WHEN TO HIDE: ELECTORAL COORDINATION AND EXIT pp. 80-105: Indridi H. Indridason
CAN UNIONS HURT WORKERS? A POSITIVE ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION POLICY pp. 106-124: Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni
CONDITIONING AID ON SOCIAL EXPENDITURES pp. 125-140: William Jack

INFLUENCE, ELECTIONS, AND THE VALUE OF A VOTE IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES pp. 289-315: Christopher S. P. Magee
THE QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT pp. 317-344: Christian Daude and Ernesto Stein
THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF IN A CUSTOMS UNION: VOTING, LOGROLLING, AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INTERESTS pp. 345-368: Samia Costa Tavares
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BUDGET DEFICITS pp. 369-420: Lori L. Leachman, Guillermo Rosas, Peter Lange and Alan Bester
THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN FIRMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES pp. 421-451: Rodolphe Desbordes and Julien VAUDAY
THE USEFULNESS OF IMPERFECT ELECTIONS: THE CASE OF VILLAGE ELECTIONS IN RURAL CHINA pp. 453-480: Loren Brandt and Matthew Turner

PARTISAN POLITICS, INTEREST RATES AND THE STOCK MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN AND BRITISH RETURNS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY pp. 135-167: Bumba Mukherjee and David Leblang
FREE TRADE AREAS AND RULES OF ORIGIN: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS pp. 169-190: Rupa Duttagupta and Arvind Panagariya
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE pp. 191-218: Priya Ranjan and Jae Young Lee
POLICY EVALUATION IN THE PRESENCE OF OUTSOURCING: GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS VERSUS POLITICAL FEASIBILITY pp. 219-234: Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Howard J. Wall
GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS AND PREFERENTIAL ACCESS TO U.S. MARKETS pp. 235-258: Daniel Lederman and Çaglar Özden
A RATIONAL CHOICE EXPLANATION FOR STALIN'S "GREAT TERROR" pp. 259-287: Vahe Lskavyan

PUBLIC FINANCE AND INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES OVER GLOBALIZATION STRATEGIES pp. 1-33: Gordon Hanson, Kenneth Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter
DO GOVERNMENTS SUPPRESS GROWTH? INSTITUTIONS, RENT-SEEKING, AND INNOVATION BLOCKING IN A MODEL OF SCHUMPETERIAN GROWTH pp. 35-52: Azam Chaudhry and Phillip Garner
IS INEQUALITY HARMFUL FOR THE ENVIRONMENT IN A GROWING ECONOMY? pp. 53-71: Hubert Kempf and Stéphane Rossignol
REVENUE TRAPS pp. 73-96: Scott Gehlbach
THE SELECTION OF POLICIES FOR BALLOT INITIATIVES: WHAT VOTERS CAN LEARN FROM LEGISLATIVE INACTION pp. 97-121: Frederick J. Boehmke and John W. Patty
PARTIES, ELECTIONS AND STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY: EVIDENCE FROM A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY pp. 123-134: Fotios Siokis and Panayotis Th. Kapopoulos