Assessing China's exchange rate regime

Jeffrey Alexander Frankel () and Shang-Jin Wei

Economic Policy, 2007, vol. 22, pages 575-627

Abstract: "The IMF Articles of Agreement forbid a country from manipulating its currency for unfair advantage. The US Treasury has been legally required since 1988 to report to Congress biannually regarding whether individual trading partners are guilty of manipulation. One part of this paper tests econometrically two competing sets of hypothesized determinants of the Treasury decisions: (1) legitimate economic variables consistent with the IMF definition of manipulation - the partners' overall current account/GDP, its reserve changes and the real overvaluation of its currency, and (2) variables suggestive of domestic American political expediency - the bilateral trade balance, US unemployment and an election year dummy. The econometric results suggest that the Treasury verdicts are driven heavily by the US bilateral deficit, though other variables also turn out to be quite important." Copyright (c) CEPR, CES, MSH, 2007.

Date: 2007
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Related works:
Working Paper: Assessing China's Exchange Rate Regime (2007)
Working Paper: Assessing China’s Exchange Rate Regime (2007)
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