Oligarchs, political regime changes, and firm valuation

Benjamin Maury and Eva Liljeblom ()

The Economics of Transition, 2009, vol. 17, issue 3, pages 411-438

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of a regime shift on the valuation of politically powerful oligarch firms. Focusing on the Yeltsin-Putin regime shift in Russia, we find that the valuations of oligarch-controlled firms are significantly higher under the Putin regime than under the Yeltsin regime after controlling for industry and time effects. The findings suggest that the increasing cost of extracting private benefits outweighs the reduction in the value of political connections following the political regime change. The results are also consistent with changes in the risk of state expropriation. Our results indicate that effects driven by the political regime change complement the traditional view that increased ownership concentration improved the performance of Russian oligarch firms. Copyright (c) 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation (c) 2009 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Date: 2009

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