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Deal or No Deal, That is the Question: The Impact of Increasing Stakes and Framing Effects on Decision-Making under Risk

Robert Brooks, Robert William Faff, Daniel Mulino and Richard Scheelings

International Review of Finance, 2009, vol. 9, issue 1-2, pages 27-50

Abstract: In this paper, we utilize data from the Australian version of the TV game show, 'Deal or No Deal', to explore risk aversion in a high real stakes setting. An attractive feature of this version of the game is that supplementary rounds may occur which switch the decision frame of players. There are four main findings. First, we observe that the degree of risk aversion generally increases with stakes. Second, we observe considerable heterogeneity in people's willingness to bear risk - even at very high stakes. Third, we find that age and gender are statistically significant determinants of risk aversion, while wealth is not. Fourth, we find that the reversal of framing does have a significant impact on people's willingness to bear risk. Copyright (c) 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation (c) International Review of Finance Ltd. 2009.

Date: 2009

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International Review of Finance is edited by Bruce D. Grundy, Naifu Chen, Ming Huang, Takao Kobayashi and Sheridan Titman

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