INDEPENDENT FISCAL AGENCIES

Xavier Debrun (), David Hauner () and Manmohan S. Kumar

Journal of Economic Surveys, 2009, vol. 23, issue 1, pages 44-81

Abstract: There has been a considerable literature regarding the incentives of policymakers as a prime reason for persistent fiscal deficits and a variety of fiscal rules have been proposed as a remedy. However, the often inadequate flexibility of rules and the success of policy delegation in the monetary realm have motivated a small but growing number of studies that suggest delegating some aspects of fiscal policy to what will here be called 'independent fiscal agencies'. This paper surveys the related literature with a focus on three aspects: the motivation for the establishment of such agencies; their potential design; and the experience with these types of institutions. Copyright © 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 2009

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