Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay

Daniel Houser () and John Wooders ()

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2006, vol. 15, issue 2, pages 353-369

Abstract: "Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation on price in a data set drawn from the online auction site eBay. Our main empirical result is that seller's, but not bidder's, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price." Copyright 2006, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2006 Blackwell Publishing.

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