Piracy and Competition

Paul Belleflamme () and Pierre M. Picard ()

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2007, vol. 16, issue 2, pages 351-383

Abstract: "The effects of (private, small-scale) piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We characterize the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in a duopoly. Comparing equilibrium prices to the prices set by a multiproduct monopolist, we show that competition drives prices up and may lead to price dispersion. Competition reduces total surplus in the short run but provides higher incentives to create in the long run." Copyright 2007, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing.

Date: 2007
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Related works:
Working Paper: Piracy and competition (2005)
Working Paper: Piracy and Competition (2004)
Working Paper: Piracy and competition (2005)
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