Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition

Esther Gal-Or ()

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1997, vol. 6, issue 1, pages 235-256

Abstract: This paper surveys recent work in contract theory that relates to the allocation of tasks among agents within an organization as well as to the effect of product market competition upon optimal contracting and agency costs. Copyright (c) 1997 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Date: 1997

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