Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship

Marc Bilodeau () and Al Slivinski ()

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1998, vol. 7, issue 4, pages 551-571

Abstract: This paper derives the decision to found a nonprofit firm as the equilibrium outcome of a multistage game among individuals who would like a public good to be provided. The model predicts that if individuals will voluntarily contribute towards provision of the public good, then it is in the self-interest of the entrepreneur to impose a nondistribution constraint on herself by founding a nonprofit firm. Copyright (c) 1998 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Date: 1998
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Related works:
Working Paper: Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship (1994)
Working Paper: Retional Nonprofit Entrepreneurship (1997)
Working Paper: Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship
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