ARE DISADVANTEGED BIDDERS DOOMED IN ASCENDING AUCTIONS?

Marco Pagnozzi ()

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2008, vol. 56, issue 3, pages 683-683

Abstract: A bidder is said to be advantaged if she has a higher expected valuation of the auction prize than her competitor. When the prize has a common-value component, a bidder competing in an ascending auction against an advantaged competitor bids especially cautiously and, hence, the advantaged bidder wins most of the time. However, contrary to what is often argued, a disadvantaged bidder still wins with positive probability, even if his competitor's advantage is very large and even if the disadvantaged bidder has the lowest actual valuation ex-post. Therefore, the disadvantaged bidder has an incentive to participate in the auction, and the presence of a bidder with a small advantage does not have a dramatic effect on the seller's revenue. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.

Date: 2008

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Working Paper: Are Disadvantaged Bidders Doomed in Ascending Auctions? (2006)
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