SPLINTERING AND INERTIA IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES -super-*

Tobias Kretschmer ()

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2008, vol. 56, issue 4, pages 685-706

Abstract: We analyse a stylised game of technology adoption with network effects and two new technologies. Potential adopters can adopt early, late or not at all. We show that one of the reasons for the failure of new technologies can be the presence of multiple incompatible variants of that technology. An adopter's individual incentives to adopt are lower with two technologies than with one. Turning to aggregate expected welfare, we find that two active technologies may be welfare-improving. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.

Date: 2008

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Journal of Industrial Economics is edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

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