PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN STACKELBERG COMPETITION -super-*

Levent Kutlu ()

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2009, vol. 57, issue 2, pages 364-364

Abstract: We examine the effects of price discrimination in the Stackelberg competition model for the linear demand case. We show that the leader does not use any price discrimination at all. Rather, the follower does all price discrimination. The leader directs all of its first mover preemptive advantage to attract the highest value consumers who pay a uniformly high price. We observe that profits and total welfare are larger and consumer surplus is smaller than those of the standard Stackelberg competition model. Copyright 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.

Date: 2009

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Journal of Industrial Economics is edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

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