The Allocational Effects of the Precision of Accounting Estimates

Ronald A. Dye and Sri S. Sridhar

Journal of Accounting Research, 2007, vol. 45, issue 4, pages 731-769

Abstract: ABSTRACTThis paper studies the allocational effects associated with the precision of accounting estimates when the precision of estimates is a choice variable for firms. One part of the paper considers the effects of the observability of precision choices. We show that, generally, making precision choices private increases firms' equilibrium precision choices and also, as a by-product, their equilibrium investment choices. We further show that, when firms' precision choices are private, there may be a "disclosure trap," in which, unless investors conjecture the owner has chosen an estimate with the highest possible precision, the owner will respond to investors' conjecture by choosing an estimate whose precision is higher than investors' conjecture. Copyright University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2007.

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