Efficient Manipulation in a Repeated Setting

Joel S. Demski, Hans Frimor and David E. M. Sappington

Journal of Accounting Research, 2004, vol. 42, issue 1, pages 31-49

Abstract: We analyze the optimal behavior of an organization when its employees can manipulate the organization's accounting system to their private advantage. We find that the organization may benefit by helping its employees manipulate the system. This help can reduce the employees' private returns from devoting effort to further manipulation of the accounting system, which reduces the cost of motivating the employees to devote their effort to improving the real (rather than the measured) performance of the organization. Copyright University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2004.

Date: 2004
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2004.00128.x link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:joares:v:42:y:2004:i:1:p:31-49

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0021-8456

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Accounting Research is edited by Ray Ball, Philip G. Berger, Merle Erickson, Richard Leftwich, Douglas J. Skinner and Abbie Smith

More articles in Journal of Accounting Research from Blackwell Publishing
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().