Do Managers Withhold Bad News?

S. P. Kothari, Susan Shu and Peter D. Wysocki

Journal of Accounting Research, 2009, vol. 47, issue 1, pages 241-276

Abstract: ABSTRACTIn this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, "on average", delays the release of bad news to investors. Copyright (c), University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2008.

Date: 2009

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