Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property

John Allan Weymark ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 10, issue 1, pages 7-26

Abstract: A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person's report of his most-preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property provided that the range of the social choice function satisfies some regularity condition. The existing proofs of this result are model specific. In this paper, a general proof strategy is proposed for showing that a strategy-proof social choice function satisfies the tops-only property when everyone has the same set of admissible preferences. Copyright 2008 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell ... 67-9779.2008.00349.x link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is edited by John P. Conley and Myrna Holtz Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().