An Algorithm for Stable and Equitable Coalition Structures with Public Goods

Fan-chin Kung ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 8, issue 3, pages 345-355

Abstract: We study the formation of coalitions that provide public goods to members. Individuals are linked on a tree graph and those with similar preferences are connected on the tree. We present a well-defined solution that selects envy-free allocations from the core. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

Date: 2006
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