Crime and Punishment and Corruption: Who Needs "Untouchables?"

Emilson C. D. Silva, Charles Milton Kahn () and Xie Zhu

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 9, issue 1, pages 69-87

Abstract: Becker's result that fines should be maximized is also applicable to some social environments where law enforcers are corrupt. If the regulated activity is legal, the principal may efficiently deter crime without an anti-corruption unit. An opportunistic anti-corruption unit, even when corrupt, becomes useful for the principal when the activity is illegal, since the principal's goal of maximizing fines motivates the unit to collect bribes from the enforcer, which subsequently induces the enforcer to be nearly completely honest, minimizing corruption. Therefore, we show that there is not necessarily an infinite regress originating with the puzzle of who polices the police. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

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