Aggregative Public Good Games

Richard Cornes and Roger Hartley

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 9, issue 2, pages 201-219

Abstract: We exploit the aggregative structure of the public good model to provide a simple analysis of the voluntary contribution game. In contrast to the best response function approach, ours avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased, and can readily analyze games involving many heterogeneous players. We demonstrate the approach at work on the standard pure public good model and show how it can analyze extensions of the basic model. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

Date: 2007
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Related works:
Working Paper: Aggregative Public Good Games (2003)
Working Paper: Aggregative Public Goods Games (2003)
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